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ABSTRACT: There is an intuition that the past does not ever change. In their paper 
‘The puzzle of the changing past’, Luca Barlassina and Fabio Del Prete argue that in 
2012 the past changed. I show that we are not in a position to accept their argument. 
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 In a recent paper entitled ‘The puzzle of the changing past’, Luca Bar-
lassina and Fabio Del Prete reject the impression that the past cannot 
change (Barlassina – Del Prete 2015). Lance Armstrong was declared the 
winner of the Tour de France cycling race on 23rd July 2000 by Union du 
Cyclisme International (UCI). On 22nd October 2012, UCI withdrew all of 
Armstrong’s Tour de France wins, because they found out that he had 
made use of banned substances while competing. Barlassina and Del Prete 
believe that this withdrawal changed the past. It was once true that Arm-
strong won the Tour de France, because of what UCI declared on 23rd July 
2000, but the withdrawal means that from 22nd October 2012 it is false that 
Armstrong won the Tour de France. Barlassina and Del Prete portray an 
aspect of the past, who won the Tour de France, as determined by an au-
thority in such a way that a declaration years later changed the past. How-
ever, there is an objection to their view and their attempt to reject this ob-
jection is at present inadequately justified. 
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 The objection I have in mind is that Armstrong was never the winner, 
whatever UCI might once have declared, because he cheated by using 
banned substances. Barlassina and Del Prete respond as follows: 
This objection rests on a confusion, by which the property being the 
winner is conflated with the property being the person who deserves to win. 
True enough, one cannot enjoy the latter property if one cheated; how-
ever, one can enjoy the former even if one cheated, since the possession 
of the property of being the winner is determined solely by a declaration 
of a competent authority, and a competent authority may, for one rea-
son or another, declare a cheater a winner. (Barlassina – Del Prete 2015, 
62) 
In order to support this point, they appeal to a case from another sport: 
football (soccer). The 1986 World Cup match between Argentina and 
England was won by Argentina, who scored two goals to England’s one, 
but one of Argentina’s goals was scored by violating a rule. Diego Mara-
dona scored a goal with his hand. The referee did not see this, we are told. 
Since Maradona’s rule violation was intentional, Argentina won despite 
cheating. This is meant to show that the property of being the winner is 
determined solely by a declaration of a competent authority (cf. Barlassina – 
Del Prete 2015, 62). 
 I will identify three obstacles to endorsing this rejection of the objec-
tion. By ‘obstacles’, I mean things that Barlassina and Del Prete, or some-
one else, must do before we are in a position to endorse this rejection. The 
obstacles are in italics below. Note that in this paper, I use ‘determine’ in 
the following sense: for X to determine that Armstrong is the winner is for 
X to make it the case that Armstrong is the winner. There is another sense 
of ‘determine’ in which if something determines who the winner is, then it 
provides a good means of finding out who the winner is. 
 1. Barlassina and Del Prete do not define ‘competent authority’. They 
put considerable effort into being precise regarding other points within 
their article, but regarding this matter the reader is left to guess the mean-
ing from the two sporting examples. However, we require a clarification be-
fore we can endorse their response to the objection. 
 There are two reasons why we require a clarification. One reason is that 
it is unclear how exactly we are to understand the term ‘competent author-
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ity’. I suspect that a football referee can be very bad at their job and still 
count as a competent authority for Barlassina and Del Prete. I wonder if 
the referee can even act on a bribe and be counted as a competent author-
ity, as they are using the term. If so, their use of the word ‘competent’ is 
potentially misleading. 
 Another reason why we require a clarification is this: there is a way of 
understanding what a competent authority is for Barlassina and Del Prete 
which leads to a regress. What determines who the Tour de France winner 
is for them? It is the competent authority on who the winner is which de-
termines this. But what determines who the competent authority is? What 
determines that it is UCI? Is it some other authority, an authority on who 
the competent authority is regarding the Tour de France winner? If so, 
what determines who that other authority is? Is it yet another authority? 
There is a danger of a regress: a regress of background authorities. Bar-
lassina and Del Prete need to either clarify what a competent authority is in 
a way that avoids this regress or else acknowledge the regress and explain 
why it is not a vicious regress. 
 2. In order to support their view that it was once true to say that Arm-
strong won the Tour de France, Barlassina and Del Prete appeal to the case 
of Argentina’s victory over England in the 1986 World Cup. Barlassina and 
Del Prete think that on the basis of this World Cup case, we should agree 
that being a winner is determined by the declaration of a competent au-
thority (Barlassina – Del Prete 2015, 62). For convenience of expression,  
I will often omit the declaration element when evaluating this view below. 
 Barlassina and Del Prete appear to make the following argument: if the 
winner of one particular competition is/was determined by a competent au-
thority, then the winner of any competition is determined by a competent 
authority; there is one particular competition in which the winner was de-
termined by a competent authority; therefore the winner of any competi-
tion is determined by a competent authority. This argument can be dis-
puted by presenting a single example in which it does not seem as if the 
winner is determined by an authority. If the impression is correct, then the 
argument must have gone wrong somewhere. (And since the first premise 
is an assumption, rather than something argued for, Barlassina and Del 
Prete are not in a strong position to insist that their conclusion applies to  
a proposed example.) 
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 Consider the following situation, which was possible once upon a time. 
Bobby Fischer and Boris Spassky agree with a certain chess authority to 
play a chess match. Fischer demands that the match be played behind 
closed doors, with no cameras present and no witnesses other than the 
players and members of the authority. Fischer wins by checkmate. But the 
authority decides to teach Fischer a lesson for being so demanding and it 
declares that Fischer lost. Fischer protests to the world at large. It seems to 
me that in this hypothetical situation, Fischer is still the winner, even if he 
cannot prove it. Maybe it will be said that in this situation, the chess au-
thority does not count as competent. But even if the chess authority had 
spoken honestly, I do not see why that would change what determines the 
winner, i.e. what makes it the case that Fischer is the winner. Why would 
it not be the same thing that determines that Fischer is the winner either 
way – in short, the fact that he checkmated Spassky? If it is, then Bar-
lassina and Del Prete’s argument must have gone wrong somewhere. They 
need to counter this challenge. 
 3. In some competitions, perhaps in all competitions, the rules specify 
the conditions that need to be met in order to be the winner. If there were 
no such specification, how would competitors know what to do? The rules 
of a race say that the winner is the person who meets certain conditions. 
Those conditions might not include or entail that the winner is whoever 
some authority declares to be the winner. For example, the rules might 
specify that the winner is the competitor who has not taken certain sub-
stances and has finished ahead of all other competitors who have not taken 
such substances. If the rules specify this, then there is potentially a clash 
between who the rules entail is the winner versus who the winner is ac-
cording to the ‘competent’ authority. Barlassina and Del Prete say that the 
objection we are considering is based on confusing who deserved to win 
with who won, but this is not necessarily true. If the rules of the Tour de 
France specify that the winner is the person who meets conditions X, Y 
and Z and Armstrong does not meet those conditions, even though he was 
once judged by the ‘competent’ authority to meet those conditions, then 
the objector may appeal to the rules as determining who the winner really 
is. Barlassina and Del Prete need to show that this appeal is mistaken. 
 Note that it is not obvious that the winner, going by the rules, is always 
identical to the person who deserves to win. If you play an opponent in  
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a one-on-one competition and they are expected to win, with good reason, 
yet they suffer an unlucky injury, forcing them to resign, do you deserve to 
win? Presumably, some people will say, ‘Yes,’ while others will say, ‘No, you 
were just lucky.’ 
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